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relating to eyewitness identification evidence over the past decade.
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 This article considers some of the more notable developments that have 
occurred in the law relating to eyewitness identification evidence over the past 
decade. In that period there has been a move away from the use of traditional 
corporeal identification parades (line-ups) in favour of video identification 
procedures in England and Wales. In the United States, the National Institute of 
Justice has published guidelines for law enforcement officers concerning the pre-
trial procedures that ought to be used to obtain identification evidence from 
eyewitnesses. This precipitated the adoption in some jurisdictions in the US of 
novel identification procedures in which those appearing in the procedure are 
presented to the witness sequentially rather than simultaneously, as they are in 
traditional identification parades or lineups. In Australia, the Uniform Evidence 
Acts 1995 (Cth and NSW) establish an exclusionary rule in respect of visual 
identification evidence where no identification parade has been conducted. A 
number of Australian jurisdictions have subsequently considered adoption of the 
Uniform Evidence Acts,1 Victoria having recently introduced a Bill which will 
lead to enactment of the uniform legislation in that jurisdiction.2 In New Zealand, 
a similar exclusionary approach is set out in recently enacted codifying 
legislation.3  
What follows is a necessarily selective evaluation of developments across 
various jurisdictions, rather than a comprehensive catalogue of procedural reform. 
The first section considers some of the normative principles that we might expect 
to shape the law relating to eyewitness identification evidence. I will argue that 
one of the principal objectives of this aspect of procedural law ought to be to 
mitigate, so far as possible, qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the 
evidence presented to the tribunal of fact.4 These deficiencies are an inevitable 
feature of criminal trials. The difficulties of reconstructing past events are such 
that evidence adduced by the parties in order to resolve contentious issues will 
rarely provide the fact-finder with conclusive proof, and will to this extent be 
qualitatively deficient. Quantitative deficiencies may often be a consequence of 
the limited resources that parties will have at their disposal. In most cases, the 
scope of police investigations will be limited. It may not be practicable to pursue 
all lines of inquiry and obtain every piece of relevant evidence. These deficiencies 
mean that the verdict delivered by a tribunal will necessarily be the product of 
some degree of speculation and consequently there will be a risk of error. I will 
                                                 
1 Including Queensland where the Queensland Law Reform Commission adopted a cautious view 
in relation to the adoption of the Uniform Evidence Acts’ provisions concerning the use of 
identification parades; see Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of the Uniform 
Evidence Acts, Report No.60, (2005; QLRC). 
2 Evidence Bill 2008 (Vic). 
3 Evidence Act 2006. 
4 A. Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, (2005, Oxford; OUP). 
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 suggest that the state has a moral duty to take reasonable steps to avoid convicting 
the innocent, and that this entails an obligation to ensure the use of procedures 
which mitigate qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the evidence presented 
at trial. It is this moral obligation that provides the evaluative framework for the 
doctrinal developments considered in the second and third sections of this paper, 
which address respectively, issues of qualitative and quantitative deficiency. 
 
I. Procedural Norms and Eyewitness Identification Evidence 
 
Eyewitness identification evidence is both a commonplace and problematic 
feature of criminal trials. Although eyewitnesses are an important source of 
evidence,5 it is widely acknowledged that their attempts to identify others, even 
those with whom they are relatively familiar, are particularly prone to error.6 
Despite the problems associated with this form of evidence and the frequency 
with which it is relied upon, the relevant academic literature often has a rather 
narrow focus. 7 A significant shortcoming in much of the writing on the subject is 
the adoption of a parochial and procedurally atomistic approach.8 Existing law is 
                                                 
5 An analysis of arrests at 10 police stations across England and Wales in a study conducted by C. 
Phillips. and  D. Brown, Entry into the Criminal Justice System: a survey of police arrests and 
their outcomes, Home Office Research Study 185, (1998, London; Home Office), disclosed that: 
eyewitness evidence was provided by a police officer in 40% of all offences resulting in an arrest; 
in 23% of all cases eyewitness identification evidence was provided by an independent witness, 
the victim providing it in 18% of all cases and security personnel in 10% of cases; in sexual 
offences and offences involving the use of violence against the person the eyewitness testimony of 
the victim was the main source of evidence. A survey of those involved in Crown Court trials 
conducted by M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Crown 
Court Study, Research Study No.19, (1993, London; HMSO), suggested that in 25% of contested 
cases, eyewitness identification evidence formed and important element of the prosecution case. 
6 See E. Connors et al., "Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of 
DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial" (1996, Washington D.C.; National Institute of 
Justice); Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental 
Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, (1976, London; HMSO) (the Devlin 
Committee/Report); Law Commission of New Zealand, Evidence: Total Recall? The reliability of 
Witness Testimony, Miscellaneous Paper 13 (1999, Wellington; NZLC); Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Report No.26, Evidence (Interim), vol.2 (1985: ALRC, Canberra), chapter 11; 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No.38, Evidence (Final),  (1987: ALRC, Canberra), 
chapter 15; Scottish Home and Health Department, Identification Procedure under Scottish 
Criminal Law, (1978, London; HMSO); N. Brooks, Law Reform Commission of Canada Study 
Paper, Pretrial Eyewitness Identification Procedures, (1983,  Ottawa; LRCC). 
7 W. Twining, “Identification and Misidentification in Legal Processes: Redefining the Problem”, 
in S. Lloyd-Bostock and B. Clifford (eds.) Evaluating Witness Testimony: Recent Psychological 
Research and New Perspectives, (1983, Chichester; Wiley), at 255-256. 
8 A. Roberts, “The Problem of Mistaken Identification: Some Observations on Process”, (2004) 8 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 100; A. Roberts, “Towards a Broader Perspective on 
the Problem of Mistaken Identification: Police Decision-making and Identification Procedures”, in 
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 taken as the starting point for much of the analysis, and the substantial body of 
empirical research on eyewitness identification provides the evaluative criteria. 
However, the agenda for empirical research appears to be largely defined by 
current legal practice, and consequently evaluation of law and procedure, and 
proposals for reform tend to be the product of a self-perpetuating cycle of limited 
scope.9 While empirical research will form part of a satisfactory and cohesive 
normative account of the procedural law concerning eyewitness identification 
evidence, the primary point of reference of such an account ought to be relevant 
legal standards. 10 
 
(i) Adjudicative Accuracy and Epistemic Uncertainty 
 
Let us take as our starting point the uncontroversial proposition that subjects have 
a fundamental right to be acquitted of crimes which they did not commit. This 
might prompt us to say that securing accurate outcomes ought to be the principal 
objective of the criminal process; it ought to facilitate the conviction and 
punishment of the factually guilty, while ensuring that the factually innocent are 
acquitted. However, while we might accept that the innocent have such a right 
and adjudicative accuracy in all criminal proceedings is something to which we 
aspire, in practice, this is unattainable. Inquiries into past events are beset by 
epistemic uncertainty.  As I have already pointed out, the evidence placed before 
fact-finders will be both qualitatively and quantitatively deficient. It will not 
provide conclusive proof of facts in issue and this qualitative deficiency will 
require the fact-finder to engage in a probabilistic reasoning process. There may 
be any number of explanations for quantitative deficiencies. I suggested in the 
introduction that the parties will generally have limited resources and that it will 
often not be possible to pursue all lines of inquiry which might yield relevant and 
probative evidence. Evidence may be lost or destroyed; tracing witnesses might 
prove to be difficult; those witnesses who are contacted might refuse to testify, 
and so on.  While there may be nothing that can be done to address some of the 
causes of evidential deficiency, it will be possible through the use of appropriate 
procedures to enhance both the quantity and quality of some of the material on 
which a verdict must be delivered.    
                                                                                                                                     
M. Freeman and B. Brooks-Gordon (eds.), Current Legal Issues, vol. 9, Law and Psychology, 
(2006, Oxford; OUP).  
9 There have been suggestions that the empirical eyewitness research agenda ought to be led by 
‘fundamental questions about the nature of the processes underlying eyewitness behaviour’ rather 
than by aspects of legal practice and procedure; see N. Brewer, N. Weber and C. Semmler, “A 
Role for Theory in Eyewitness Research”, in  R. Lindsay, D. Ross, D. Read and M. Toglia (eds), 
The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology, vol. 2, Memory for People, (2007, New Jersey; 
Lawrence Erlbaum). 
10 Twining, op. cit. n. 7. 
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 The overarching objective of adjudicative accuracy requires the adoption 
of identification procedures which mitigate, as far as possible, qualitative and 
qualitative deficiencies in evidence presented to fact-finders. 11  This implies, 
firstly, the use of procedures which are known to produce the most reliable 
identification evidence. But it also requires those procedures to be used wherever 
doing so might produce evidence which is likely to lead to more accurate 
adjudication.  
Qualitative and quantitative evidential deficiencies are likely to be 
exacerbated by the adversarial nature of proceedings. In adversarial systems, the 
trial constitutes the climactic centerpiece of the criminal process; a contest 
between the state and the defendant.12 The desire to prevail in this contest might 
induce a tendency in each of the parties to collect and present only evidence 
which advances its own interests, and also to suppress any evidence which serves 
the opposition’s interests. Such problems are particularly acute in criminal 
proceedings in which one party, the prosecution, enjoys considerable systemic 
advantages, both in terms of the resources made available to it by the state, and 
the de facto control it has over access to most sources of evidence, or the means 
of generating it.  
In the context with which we are concerned, this adversarial bias may lead 
the police to use identification procedures which increase the likelihood of 
obtaining evidence which supports the prosecution case by producing a positive 
identification of the suspect, but which are not designed to produce reliable 
evidence.13 Why might this tendency arise? To the detached observer, the use of a 
procedure which is likely to produce evidence of limited probative value, rather 
than an alternative procedure through which much more reliable evidence could 
have been procured, may seem irrational. One explanation for such decisions 
might be that the outcome of procedures which are conducted under conditions 
which control various forms of bias and suggestiveness are less predictable than 
those which do not take place under such conditions. In the early stages of an 
investigation, the need to obtain some form of identification evidence in order to 
construct a prima facie case against a suspect might be prioritised over concerns 
relating to the probative value of the evidence which might be obtained. This form 
of adversarial bias is evident in the procedures adopted by the police in the 
                                                 
11 I do not suggest that this ought to be considered the only function of identification procedures, 
although it is perhaps the least controversial. Some have claimed, for example, that securing 
opportunities for participation in procedures ought to be considered an end in itself, to be pursued 
notwithstanding that participation could have no effect on the outcome of proceedings; see 
generally D. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures 
(1996, Oxford; Clarendon) , 75-82. 
12 M. Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift, (1997, New Haven; Yale), 58-60. 
13 A suggestion made by the High Court of Australia in Alexander v R (1981) 34 ALR 289.   
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 English case, R v Marcus.14 The suspect, M, was of unusual appearance and the 
police had difficulty in obtaining images for use in a video identification 
procedure of volunteers who bore a sufficient resemblance. The images had, with 
the agreement of the defence, been masked so as to obscure any significant 
differences in appearance. However, after consulting the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the police compiled a second set of unmasked images, which would be 
shown to the witness if M was not identified from the masked images. After 
failing to identify M when shown the masked images, the witness perhaps 
unsurprisingly, picked him out when shown the unmasked images. At trial, a 
police witness conceded that M “blatantly” stood out and that the procedure was 
unfair. It came to light that the decision to show the witness unmasked images 
was a consequence of police frustration at the ‘poor results’ (presumably a low 
rate of suspect identification) which had been obtained when masked images had 
been used.   
In addition to their effect of the quality of evidence that might be 
presented to the tribunal of fact, partisan interests might exacerbate quantitative 
deficiencies in the evidence. The difficulties of predicting the outcome of formal 
identification procedures with any certainty might lead the police to avoid 
conducting a procedure where there are other forms of evidence which might be 
used to prove identity; facial mapping evidence, possession of recently stolen 
property, DNA evidence etc. Although the idea will not be discussed in any detail 
here, these adversarial tendencies, and the relatively weak position of the suspect, 
provide the justification for giving suspects certain procedural rights; a right to 
procedures which might produce evidence which supports the defence case (a 
participatory right), and a right to procedures which produce the most accurate 
identification evidence (a protective right).15  
 
(ii) The Problem of Finite Resources 
 
The issue of resources is often overlooked by those advocating procedural reform 
and too readily invoked by policy-makers as a reason for rejecting proposals for 
reform. The finite resources made available to the criminal justice system 
generally, and the police in particular, may limit the state’s capacity to adopt 
procedures which are likely to mitigate qualitative and quantitative evidential 
deficiencies.  
The reality of finite resources presents a problem when we come to 
consider whether the state is under an obligation to use the most accurate possible 
procedures for obtaining identification evidence.  If the innocent possess a 
                                                 
14 [2004] EWCA Crim 3387; The Times, December 3, 2004. 
15  See A. Roberts, “Pre-Trial Defence Rights and the Fair Use of Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures”, (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 331. 
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 fundamental right not to be convicted, and one of the principal functions of 
criminal procedure is to ensure adjudicative accuracy, it seems to follow that 
those who are accused of wrongdoing by the state have a right to the most 
accurate procedures for determining innocence and guilt. Where identification is, 
or might become, a central issue in a case, must the police always use procedures 
which are thought to produce the most reliable identification evidence? In other 
words, does a suspect have a right to the most accurate identification procedures?  
One way of addressing the problem of finite resources is to claim that the 
suspect’s right to the use of the most accurate identification procedures is a 
qualified right. Dworkin, for example, argues that an absolute right to the most 
accurate procedures for determining innocence and guilt would require the 
criminal justice system to have first call on the resources available to a 
government.16 Diversion of resources into the criminal justice system to give 
effect to this right would lead to a state of affairs in which there were insufficient 
resources to fund other aspects of governments’ welfare obligations. Dworkin’s 
solution to this problem is to suggest that the degree of procedural accuracy to 
which a suspect is entitled ought to be determined according to the extent of the 
harm to which procedural error would give rise. So those who are accused of the 
most serious crimes and who would suffer the greatest harm in the event of 
wrongful conviction would have a right to the most accurate procedures. As the 
gravity of the consequences of wrongful conviction subsides, so does the degree 
of procedural accuracy to which the suspect is entitled. However, Galligan has 
pointed out the flaws in this approach.17 If one acknowledges, as Dworkin does, 
that the innocent have a profound right not to be convicted, it seems rather strange 
to argue that there is no implicit right to the most accurate procedures for 
establishing innocence. As Galligan points out, procedures constitute the means of 
achieving some desired end and cannot, therefore, be extricated from the 
outcomes they produce.18 Dworkin’s account of the extent of a suspect’s right to 
procedural accuracy rests on an untenable distinction; it purports to acknowledge 
the suspect’s right to an outcome while denying him a right to the best means of 
achieving it.  
Galligan offers a more coherent account of the right to procedural 
accuracy, which addresses the problem of finite resources. A suspect’s 
fundamental right not to be convicted of crimes of which he is innocent, 
necessarily implies a right to the most accurate procedures for determining that 
outcome. However, the problem of finite resources might be such that the state 
cannot always discharge its duty to provide suspects with such procedures. 
Galligan suggests that while finite resources cannot justify any dilution of a 
                                                 
16 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985, Oxford; OUP), ch.3. 
17 Galligan op. cit n. 11, 112-122. 
18 Ibid, 118. 
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 suspect’s rights in this respect, the state might be excused where it has done its 
best to give effect to the suspect’s rights by using the most reliable procedures 
possible.19 He argues further, that the state ought to be guided by fundamental 
principles of procedural justice - proportionality and equality - in allocating its 
resources.20 These principles require the state to use the most accurate procedures 
in respect of those facing the most serious allegations, and provide the same 
procedural guarantees to those who are similarly positioned. In practice, the 
accounts provided by Galligan and Dworkin appear lead to the same conclusion, 
though that provided by the former takes a more satisfactory route. 
 
(iii) The Forensic Inadequacies of the Criminal Trial   
 
The discussion so far has gravitated towards pre-trial identification procedures. 
However there are good reasons why, if our concern is the accuracy of 
identification evidence, we ought to focus on this stage of proceedings. The 
problems of reconstructing past events at trial were noted earlier and it was 
suggested that one of the underlying functions of procedure concerning 
eyewitness identification is to ensure that the tribunal of fact is presented with 
eyewitness identification evidence which is as reliable as possible. In many 
jurisdictions, it appears that the trial is still thought to provide satisfactory 
processes for evaluating the reliability of such evidence. However, as the Devlin 
Committee21 noted, the traditional means of testing the veracity of evidence at 
trial - demeanour and cross-examination - are largely impotent when it comes to 
assessing this form of evidence. Identification evidence presented by an 
eyewitness is the product of a number of distinct cognitive processes: (i) 
perception of information during observation of the earlier relevant event, (ii) 
encoding of that information in the memory, (iii) a period of retention until, (iv) 
information is retrieved from the memory for an identification task, a process 
which involves (v) a comparison of the suspect and retrieved memory of the 
culprit.22 
The integrity of these processes can be undermined by various internal and 
external influences, and where this occurs a witness’s capacity to make an 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 116. 
20 Ibid, 119-127. 
21 op. cit. n.6. 
22 See the decision of the High Court of Australia in Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429, at 446: “An 
honest witness who says ‘the prisoner is the man who drove the car’ whilst appearing to affirm a 
simple, clear and impressive proposition, is really asserting: (i) that he observed the driver; (ii) that 
the observation became impressed upon his mind; (iii) that he still retained the original impression; 
(iv) that such impression has not been affected, altered, or replaced... and; (v) that the resemblance 
between the original impression, and the prisoner is sufficient to base a judgment not of 
resemblance, but of identity.” 
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 accurate identification may be compromised. It is not possible here to provide a 
detailed taxonomy of the factors that might have such an effect. In any case, only 
brief reference to the findings of empirical research is sufficient to indicate their 
nature and diversity. The age of the witness,23 a culprit and witness who are of 
different ethnic appearance,24 the presence of weapon25 and intoxication,26 for 
example, are all matters which appear to affect perception and encoding of 
information in a way that reduces the likelihood of a subsequent identification 
being accurate. Retained memories will decay over time and the malleability of 
memory is such that information provided by third parties after the original event 
can create ‘new memories’ which may later be recalled as facts observed during 
that event. Research has shown that the language used by an investigator when 
questioning a witness can influence the witness’s recollections of events.27 During 
retention and retrieval, original memories can be lost or altered, new memories 
created and the witness’s confidence in the accuracy of his recollections 
reinforced and inflated.28  
As the Devlin Committee pointed out, eyewitness identification evidence 
presents a significant epistemic problem. The witness may claim that the suspect 
or defendant is the person he saw engaged in alleged wrongdoing, but how do we 
                                                 
23 See, e.g. J. Searcy, J. Bartlett and A. Memon, “Influence of Post-Event Narratives, Line-up 
Conditions and Individual Differences on False Identification by Young and Older Eyewitness” 
(2000) 5 Legal and Criminological Psychology 219. 
24 For a review of the research on this effect see C. Meissner and J. Brigham, “Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces”, (2001) 7 Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 3. For discussion of the implications for the US Constitution’s Due Process clause of the 
cross-race effect see R. Natarajan, “Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to 
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications” (2003) 78 New York University Law Review 1789.  
25 For a recent review of the relevant research see K. Pickel, “Remembering and Identifying 
Menacing Perpetrators: Exposure to Violence and the Weapon Focus Effect”, in Lindsay et al, op. 
cit. n.9.  
26 D. Reid, J. Yuille and P. Tollestrup, “Recollections of a robbery: Effects of Arousal and Alcohol 
Unpon Recall  and Person Identification”, (1992) 16 Law and Human Behavior 425; J. Yuille and 
P. Tollestrup, “Some Effects of Alcohol on Eyewitness Memory”, (1990) 75 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 268. 
27  E. Loftus and J. Palmer, “Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An example of the 
Interaction Between Language and Memory”, (1974) 13 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior 585; E. Loftus and G. Zanni, “Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of the Wording of a 
Question” (1975) 5 Bulletin of Psychonomic Science 86; R. Christiansen, J. Sweeney and K. 
Ochalek, “Influencing Eyewitness Descriptions” (1983), 7 Law and Human Behavior 59 
28  There is a vast literature on these issues. See e.g. E. Loftus, “Make-Believe Memories”, 
American Psychologist, November 2003, 867. E. Loftus and G. Hoffman, “Misinformation and 
Memory: The creation of New Memories, (1989) 118 Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General 100; A.Scoboria et al, “Immediate and persisting Effects of Misleading Questions and 
Hypnosis on Memory Reports, (2002) 8 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 26; R. 
Belli, “Influences of Misleading Postevent Information: Misinformation Interference and 
Acceptance, (1989) 118 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 72.  
8 International Commentary on Evidence Vol. 6, No. 2, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol6/iss2/art3
 establish how much information the witness perceived during the original event; 
how much of that information was stored in the memory; the extent to which it 
has been distorted or supplemented, or has decayed; exactly how closely does the 
witness’s recollection of the culprit’s appearance correspond with the appearance 
of the suspect or defendant? At trial, cross-examination might reveal the existence 
of some of the factors that are known to adversely affect identification accuracy, 
and experts can be called to explain the findings of research into such matters. 
Judicial warnings may be issued admonishing fact-finders of the need for caution 
in convicting on the basis of eyewitness identification evidence or directing their 
attention to the circumstances which suggest that the witness might be mistaken.29 
However, none of these measures can tell us much about the state of the 
witness’s memory.30 Much more can be achieved in this respect through the use 
of formal pre-trial identification procedures. The outcome of well-designed 
procedures, which require the witness to make choices about a number of 
individuals of similar appearance, all of whom, apart from the suspect are known 
to be innocent, may provide some indication of the quality of the witness’s 
memory. Where the witness identifies the suspect during such a procedure, there 
is a satisfactory basis (that is, evidence derived from the suspect’s memory rather 
than evidence concerning the presence or absence of factors associated with 
reliability generally) for inferring both that the witness’s memory is accurate, and 
consequently, that the suspect is the person that the witness saw engaged in 
wrongdoing. That inference may be more reliable where procedures are 
conducted at the earliest opportunity. The shorter the period between a witness’s 
perception of the offender and any procedure designed to elicit reliable 
identification evidence, the less likely it is that a witness will have been exposed 
to situations which give rise to a risk of memory distortion.    
To summarise, maximization of the quantity and quality of evidence 
presented at trial ought to constitute fundamental objectives of procedural law 
                                                 
29 In Neil v Biggars 409 US 188 (1972), for example, the Supreme Court suggested that the 
following factors might be relevant an assessment of the reliability of any identification evidence: 
(i) the witness’s view of events and attentiveness, (ii) the accuracy of the description provided by 
the witness, (iii) the degree of certainty with which the identification was made, (iv) the length of 
time that had elapsed between the crime and the identification procedure. This decision has been 
criticized on the grounds that they are out of step with the findings of subsequent empirical; see 
e.g. G. Wells and D. Quinlivan, “Sugegstive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the 
Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later”, Law and 
Human Behavior (in press). 
30  Devlin Report, op. cit. n.6, paragraph 4.25; see also J. Jackson, “The Insufficiency of 
Identification Evidence Based on Personal Impression”, [1986] Criminal Law Review 203; T. 
Dillickrath, “Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alternatives”, 
(2001) 55 University of Miami Law Review 1059, at 1065; R. Wise, K. Daupinais and M. Safer, 
“A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error”, (2007) 97 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
807, 828-30. 
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 relating to eyewitness identification. The forensic inadequacies of the criminal 
trial are such that efforts to ensure the quality of eyewitness identification 
evidence ought to focus primarily on the pre-trial procedures. If we acknowledge 
that the innocent have a fundamental right not to be convicted we must accept that 
suspects have a right to the use of procedures that are likely to produce the most 
reliable identification evidence. However, the state may be excused for failing to 
give effect to that right when faced with significant practical obstacles, including 
the problem of finite resources. While the problem of reliability has long been an 
issue that has been associated with eyewitness identification evidence, the state’s 
(and more pointedly, police) control over the means of generating such evidence 
is an issue that has not received the same degree of attention. But effective pursuit 
of the ends of adjudicative accuracy requires some thought to be given to ensuring 
that formal identification procedures are conducted where the outcome might 
have a bearing on the accuracy of the fact-finding process.  
We now have a framework within which we can consider the extent to 
which procedural developments in various jurisdictions further the objectives of 
maximizing the quality and quantity of identification evidence which is made 
available to the fact-finder. We start with the former and consider the adoption in 
some US jurisdictions of the sequential lineup, and legislative provisions in 
Australia and New Zealand which establish evidential exclusionary presumptions 
where formal pre-trial procedures are not conducted. The final section considers 
the extent to which the idea of a right to participate in procedures is reflected in 
legal procedures. It examines the problems that have been encountered in 
attempting to regulate the decision-making process which determines whether or 
not formal identification procedures are conducted in England and Wales.   
 
II. Mitigating Qualitative Deficiency 
 
(i) Sequential Procedures and Blind Administrators  
 
For some time, those engaged in empirical research have been arguing for the 
adoption of ‘sequential line-ups’ rather than more traditional procedures in which 
the subjects are presented simultaneously. In addition to the individual 
presentation of subjects, the sequential lineup differs fundamentally from 
traditional procedures by requiring the witness to make a decision in relation to 
one subject before being shown the next. As soon as the witness makes an 
identification the procedure is concluded and the witness is not permitted to see 
the remaining subjects. Those advocating the use of this procedure point to 
research that suggests its use will lead to fewer instances of ‘false positive’ 
identification. In other words, it appears that innocent suspects are less likely to 
be mistakenly identified in a sequential procedure than in a traditional 
10 International Commentary on Evidence Vol. 6, No. 2, Article 3
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 simultaneous procedure. 31  Although this finding has been replicated across a 
number of studies, findings concerning the effect that the use of sequential 
procedures has on the rate of accurate identifications (that is, the identification of 
the culprit) is rather more inconsistent. The majority of the research suggests that 
the use of this form of procedure has a negligible effect on the rate of accurate 
identification, but there are some studies in which its use has been found to 
significantly reduce the rate of such outcomes.32 In jurisdictions in which the 
rhetoric of crime control is valuable political currency, one might expect some 
resistance to the adoption of procedures which are likely to result in the 
conviction of fewer factually guilty suspects, notwithstanding the likelihood that 
use of such procedures might also produce a significant reduction in the incidence 
of wrongful conviction. However, the sequential procedure has been adopted in a 
number of jurisdictions in the United States.33  
Publication by the National Institute of Justice of guidelines for 
conducting pre-trial identification procedures (hereafter ‘the NIJ Guide’) has been 
instrumental in the move towards the use of the sequential lineup.34 The NIJ 
Guide provides model procedures which were drafted by a working group 
comprising psychologists, prosecutors and police officers. Although the document 
contains instructions for conducting both simultaneous and sequential line-ups, it 
expresses a preference for neither. However, some have argued that the US 
constitutional Due Process clause requires exclusive use of the sequential line-up 
procedure on the grounds that it reduces the incidence of false positive 
identification. 35  We noted earlier though, that any guarantee of procedural 
accuracy must be subject to some qualification; the state may be excused for a 
                                                 
31 See N. Steblay et al., “Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup 
Presentations: A Meta Analytic Comparison”, (2001) 25 Law and Human Behavior 459. For a 
review of the relevant research findings and the limitations of the procedure, see P. Dupuis and R. 
Lindsay, Radical Alternatives to Traditional Lineups, in Lindsay et al, op. cit. n.9, 184-192. 
32 See e.g. T. Valentine, S. Darling and A. Memon, “Do strict rules and moving images increase 
the reliability of sequential identification procedures?, (2007) 21 Applied Cognitive Psychology 
933. 
33  e.g Wisconsin: 2005 Wisconsin Act 60; New Jersey, see Attorney General’s Guidelines, 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf (accessed September 2008). For a sceptical 
report on the effectiveness of the procedure, see S. Mecklenburg, Report to the Legislature of the 
State of Illinois: The Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double Blind Identification Procedures 
(2006); http://www.chicagopolice.org/IL%Pilot%20Eyewitness%20ID.pdf  (accessed September 
2008). However, see D. Schacter et al., “Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the 
Field”, (2007) 32 Law and Human Behavior 3; K. Findley, “Innocents at Risk:  Adversary 
Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth”, (2008) 38 Seton Hall Law Review 893, 
958-964 for a critical analysis of the methodology employed in this research. 
34  “Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement”, (1999, Washington DC; National 
Institute of Justice). 
35 See M. R. Headley, “Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for Process Long 
Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures”, (2002) 53 Hastings Law Journal 681. 
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 failure to conduct the most accurate identification procedures where it faces 
significant practical obstacles to doing so. This appears to be addressed in the 
Guide. While it states that the underlying purpose of pre-trial identification 
procedures is to obtain ‘accurate identification and non-identification decisions’,36 
the document’s preamble suggests that those which it addresses should give 
‘careful consideration’ both to the procedures set out in the NIJ Guide and to 
unique local conditions and logistical circumstances.37 Nevertheless, the Guide 
might be criticised for its prevarication. If the drafters accepted the validity of the 
science on which the sequential lineup is based, a preference ought to have been 
expressed for that procedure, subject to some qualification relating to the 
practicability of conducting the procedure.  
If mitigation of qualitative deficiency is a fundamental objective of 
eyewitness identification procedures, preference for either sequential or 
simultaneous procedures ought to be determined primarily by the net gain in 
accuracy that might be achieved.  If the use of sequential procedures results in 
fewer false positive outcomes, while producing a relatively smaller decrease in 
the rate of accurate positive identification, as the findings of various studies 
suggest, their adoption would lead to an overall increase in outcome accuracy 
compared with the use of simultaneous procedures.38  One explanation of the 
significant reduction in the rate of false positive identification produced by 
sequential lineups when compared with simultaneous presentation concerns the 
judgment strategy that the witness may use in the respective procedures.  
Simultaneous presentation of subjects allows the witness to compare the persons 
appearing in the procedure to one another. It is suggested that this might lead to 
the witness selecting the subject who bears the closest resemblance to the culprit, 
though that resemblance may not, in fact, be particularly close. The suspect may 
be identified on the basis that he is the ‘best candidate’. 
Because in the sequential lineup the witness is shown only one image at a 
time and is required to make a decision in relation to each image before the next is 
shown, the opportunity to compare subjects does not arise. Because intra-subject 
comparison is not possible, any identification is more likely to based on there 
being a close similarity in the suspect’s appearance and the witness’s recollection 
of the culprit. It has been suggested that, as identification of a suspect through a 
shallow relative judgment may amount to no more than speculation on the part of 
                                                 
36 Op. cit. n.34, 29 
37 Ibid, iii.  
38 This type of calculus might be rather more difficult if, for example, the use of sequential 
procedures brought about a roughly equal decrease in false positive identifications and accurate 
positive identifications respectively. In such circumstances the adoption of the procedure might 
still be justified but on the grounds of the appropriate allocation of risk between suspect and state. 
It might be considered preferable to sacrifice a reduction in the rate of accurate positive 
identifications for a corresponding reduction in the rate of false positive identification. 
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 the witness, a higher rate of false identification might be expected. This kind of 
speculation on the part of the witness might be expected to lead to identification 
of suspects from time-to-time. If the opportunity to speculate is removed then the 
rate of accurate identification may fall. However, suppose further research were to 
reveal that the use of sequential lineups brought about a roughly equal reduction 
in the rate of false and accurate positive identifications; that its use would produce 
no net gain in procedural accuracy. Some might still advocate adoption of the 
sequential lineup on the grounds that its use would lead to an appropriate 
allocation of the risk of error between suspect and state. A reduction in the rate of 
accurate positive identifications might be viewed as a acceptable price for greater 
protection against the risk of false positive identification.  
In England and Wales regulation of pre-trial identification procedures is 
provided by Code D of the Codes of Practice issued under section 66 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Code prescribes in some detail various 
procedures that may be used by the police to obtain identification evidence from 
an eyewitness, and it establishes a clear hierarchy among those procedures. 
Following revision of the Code in 2002, video identification procedures, in which 
images of the suspect and innocent fillers are presented sequentially, supplanted 
the traditional identification parade as the principal identification procedure.39 The 
video identification procedure, differs significantly from the sequential lineup 
described in the NIJ Guide. Although the video identification procedure involves 
the sequential presentation of single images the witness is not required to make a 
decision in respect of one image before being permitted to view the next. Indeed, 
the provisions of the Code require the witness to view the entire set of images at 
least twice before making any identification, and also that officers conducting the 
procedures inform witnesses that there is no limit on the number of times that they 
may see the sequence, or part of the sequence, of images. 40  Only minor 
modification of the instructions given to witnesses would be needed for the video 
identification procedure prescribed to incorporate the essential features of a 
sequential lineup and this would appear to have no significant resource 
implications. If, as the research suggests, a sequential lineup is the most accurate 
identification procedure, some may argue that continued failure to make the 
changes amounts to a violation of a suspect’s right to the use of the most accurate 
identification procedures.  
Similar claims regarding a suspect’s procedural rights might also follow 
the failure to adopt procedures which are designed to ensure that those 
administering procedures, whether sequential or simultaneous, are unaware of the 
                                                 
39 See paragraph D3.14 of the current version of the Code (issued 2008) which provides that the 
“suspect shall initially be offered a video identification unless it is not practicable or an 
identification parade is more practicable and more suitable…” 
40 Code D, Annex A, paragraph 11. 
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 identity of the suspect. Research suggests that administrators who possess this 
knowledge may inadvertently provide cues which may indicate to the witness 
which of the participants in the procedure is the suspect.41 If the use of a ‘blind’ 
administrator does, in fact, eliminate any bias towards selection of the suspect 
caused by cues provided unconsciously by administrators, the only grounds for 
opposing adoption of this measure can be that it imposes an unreasonable cost. 42 
Although blind procedures are not included in the recommendations set out in the 
NIJ Guide, on the grounds that they may prove to be impractical in some 
jurisdictions, there is an acknowledgement that the future use of this form of 
procedure is something that might be kept under review.43 
 
(ii) Securing Procedural Accuracy through Exclusionary Rules 
 
It was suggested in the introductory section that much of the literature on the legal 
response to the problem associated with eyewitness identification evidence tends 
to adopt an atomistic approach. This kind of approach fails to acknowledge that 
such evidence will be the subject of a series of decision-making processes, and 
that each decision-maker may be influenced by the nature of the decision-making 
processes which precede or follow his or her decision.44 The value of formal 
identification procedures in furthering the objective of ensuring that the evidence 
presented at trial is as reliable as possible is contingent on the quality of the 
decision-making process which determines when they are used. It was suggested 
earlier that the adversarial nature of proceedings and the desire to construct a 
prima facie case against a suspect might lead the police to adopt procedures 
which do not produce identification evidence which is particularly probative. 
Where decision-makers are aware that the use of such procedures will have 
adverse effects there may be an incentive to use more reliable procedures. The 
corollary, of course, is that where no significant adverse consequences are likely 
to follow the use of less reliable procedures there is little incentive to use the more 
reliable procedures, those which provide the suspect with greater protection 
                                                 
41 M. Phillips, B. McAuliff, M. Kovera and B. Cutler, “Double-blind Photoarray Administration as 
a Safeguard against Investigator Bias” (1999) 84 Journal of Applied Psychology 940. See also, L. 
Garrioch and C. Brimacombe, “Line-up Administrators Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness 
Confidence” (2001) 25 Law and Human Behavior 299. 
42 See M. Risinger, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction 
Rate”, (2007) 97 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 761, who suggests that this is reform 
would be ‘cost-free’ in terms of acquittal of the factually guilty and ought to be adopted. Other 
have suggested that although there may be ‘logistical problems’ there are various ways in which 
these might be circumvented, see e.g. R. Wilcock, R. Bull and R. Milne, Witness Identification in 
Criminal Cases: Psychology and Practice, (2008, Oxford; OUP), 131-3.    
43 NIJ Guide, op. cit. n.34, p.9. 
44 See further, A. Roberts, Current Legal Issues, op. cit. n.8. 
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 against the risk of mistaken identification. Observations on the exercise of judicial 
discretion made by the Australian Law Reform Commission are interesting in this 
respect:45  
 
“A reading of reported Australian cases leaves the impression of a 
reluctance on the part of trial judges to exclude eyewitness 
identification evidence, however unreliable or weak it may seem. 
Instead reliance is placed on the warning to the jury and appellate 
courts give lengthy statements about the appropriate detail of such 
warnings. So, even evidence of identification which is so liable to 
being mistaken that it would be ‘extremely dangerous for a jury to 
assign any probative value to it’ may be properly admitted as long as a 
jury is given a warning in such terms.”46  [internal references omitted] 
 
Although concerned with the exercise of discretion by Australian judges, 
these observations have a salience which extends beyond the boundaries of that 
jurisdiction. In England and Wales, trial judges have discretion to exclude 
prosecution evidence where its reception would have an adverse effect the 
fairness of proceedings.47 While failure to follow the provisions of Code D might, 
in theory, lead to the exclusion of identification evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely, the appellate courts rarely interfere with a trial 
judge’s decision to admit identification evidence where the police have breached 
the Code.  
R v Williams48  provides a particularly striking example of the appellate 
courts’ laissez-faire approach in relation to review of the exercise of judicial 
discretion. W had been convicted of attempted robbery. The victim had been 
waiting at a bus stop when she was engaged in conversation by a man who 
gradually struck a more menacing tone. He eventually threatened to stab her with 
a hypodermic needle and demanded her cash and jewelry. She managed to escape 
and provided the police with a description of the offender over the telephone. 
Police officers making their way to the crime scene passed W, who immediately 
took flight and was detained after a short pursuit. There were significant 
discrepancies in the description of the culprit provided by the victim and W’s 
appearance. The culprit had been described as a clean-shaven man with a local 
London accent, who wore brown shoes. W had a very distinctive Scottish accent, 
two to three days stubble, and had been wearing black shoes. If these 
                                                 
45  Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, Report No.26. Interim, (1985, Canberra; 
ALRC). 
46 Ibid, [424]. 
47 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, section 78. 
48 [2003] EWCA Crim 3200. 
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 discrepancies give rise to concerns over identification of W as the culprit, the 
manner in which the witness was invited to identify W undoubtedly compounds 
those concerns.  The procedure followed by the police breached various 
provisions of Code D, in respect of which the Court of Appeal observed that:  
 
“… the identification took place in circumstances which were clearly 
capable of resulting in the victim … being, in effect, by the 
circumstances, told that this was the person who had attempted to 
rob her, that is by reason of the fact that it was clear that he had been 
apprehended, was in handcuffs and was surrounded by police 
officers. A clearer way of pointing out to her who it was that the 
police sought her to identify could not have been imagined.”49 
 
Although the prosecution case rested entirely on the identification evidence 
provided by the victim, the police had disregarded important provisions of Code 
D which were designed to ensue the quality of the evidence, and it was accepted 
that the police could not have adopted a procedure which was any more 
suggestive, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the evidence had been properly 
admitted. It concluded that, as the witness had had an opportunity to observe the 
offender at close quarters for some time, and the jury had been adequately warned 
of the need for caution in convicting on the basis of the witness’s identification 
evidence, it could not be said that the jury’s verdict was unsafe.  
It was suggested in the previous section of this paper, that the fundamental 
right of innocent suspects not to be convicted necessarily implies a right to the 
most accurate procedures for determining innocence and guilt. However, the state 
might be excused for failing to give effect to that right where it is confronted with 
significant practical obstacles. In other words there it has a duty to ensure that the 
police use the most reliable procedure from the range of procedures which are, in 
the circumstances, practicable. But this cannot be the extent of the right. The 
procedures used must meet some minimum threshold of accuracy. Some pre-trial 
procedures might be so unreliable that the resulting evidence is of little or no 
probative value and, practical obstacles notwithstanding, their use will be 
inconsistent with the procedural guarantees that are implied by a suspect’s 
fundamental right not to be convicted of crimes of which he is innocent. In light 
of the inadequacies of the trial as a means of satisfactorily evaluating eyewitness 
identification evidence, we might conclude that the use of such procedures gives 
rise to an unacceptable prejudicial effect.  
Williams appears objectionable on two grounds. The first is that the police 
failed to use the most reliable procedure that could have been used in the 
                                                 
49 at [12]. 
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 circumstances. Whether or not the formalities had been complied with, the 
suspect was effectively under arrest, and in such circumstances a formal 
procedure could (and should) 50  have been conducted under conditions which 
controlled the risk of error. The second objection is that the procedure used was 
so suggestive that it could reasonably be concluded that no probative value ought 
to have been attached to the resulting evidence. Indeed, we might go further and 
suggest that such was the importance of the evidence obtained through the use of 
that procedure, it comprising the prosecution case against the defendant, that 
allowing a jury to consider it in reaching its verdict  deprived W of a fair trial.  
One way of mitigating qualitative deficiencies in the evidence adduced at 
trial is to require the use of pre-trial procedures which are known to produce 
reliable identification evidence as a condition of admissibility. This is the 
approach taken in those Australian jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform 
Evidence Act, 51  and following enactment of the Evidence Act 2006, is the 
prevailing approach in New Zealand.52  
 
(a) Australia: Uniform Evidence Acts 
 
In Australia, the broad position is that admissibility of ‘visual identification’53 is 
predicated on there having been an ‘identification parade’ held prior to trial. This 
position is, however, qualified. Evidence is admissible notwithstanding the failure 
to conduct an identification parade where it would not have been reasonable to 
conduct one,54 or where the defendant refused to participate in one.55 The statute 
provides a non-exhaustive list of factors which the court is required to take into 
account in determining the reasonableness of a failure to conduct an identification 
parade.56 These include: the nature and gravity of the offence concerned; the 
importance of the evidence; the defendant’s failure to co-operate in the parade, 
and the practicality of conducting a parade in view of the relationship between the 
witness and defendant.  
                                                 
50 Code D requires a video identification procedure to be conducted where there is sufficient 
information to justify the arrest of the individual for suspected involvement in the offence; 
paragraph D3.4. 
51 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) section 114; Evidence Act (NSW) section 114; Evidence Act 2004 
(NI) section 114. 
52 Evidence Act 2006, section 45.  
53 ‘Visual identification’ is defined in section 114(1) as “identification evidence relating to an 
identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture 
identification evidence”. 
54 Section 114(2)(b). 
55 Section 114(2)(c). 
56 Section 114(3). 
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 If we consider this legislation in light of the normative principles 
discussed earlier, in some respects it appears to provide a more satisfactory 
approach than that taken by English criminal procedure. Among its virtues is that 
it establishes a prima facie presumption of exclusion where eyewitness 
identification evidence is obtained by procedures that do not offer the degree of 
procedural accuracy which is provided by an identification parade. Further, the 
exceptions to this presumption closely reflect the normative position that the state 
may be excused for failing to provide the suspect with the most accurate 
procedures where it faces significant practical obstacles to doing so. For example, 
by referring to the nature and gravity of the offences being investigated as a factor 
which is relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of a failure to conduct a 
parade, the issue of finite resources is acknowledged. Presumably, in taking 
account of this factor trial judges will, in effect, be applying some form of 
proportionality principle. The more serious the allegation against a defendant, the 
greater the need to ensure that the most accurate identification procedures are 
used, and the less excusable any failure to do so.  
This approach might, however, be vulnerable to criticism that trial judges 
will be deciding the appropriate allocation of resources, and that this is a political 
issue which ought to be determined by a democratically elected and accountable 
institution. Furthermore, devolving decisions over the allocation of resources to 
trial judges will probably result in a degree of inconsistency and this may leave 
the state open to charges of failure to discharge its duty to treat all of those who 
fall under suspicion of wrongdoing with equal concern and respect. In contrast, 
English criminal procedure appears to promise all suspects a right to the most 
accurate identification procedures irrespective of the nature of the allegations that 
they face.57 This failure to address the issue of limited resources in the regulatory 
provisions has led to ad hoc adjudicative legislating. This has given rise not only 
to inconsistent judicial decision-making but also an undesirable lack of clarity in 
the relevant principles. In some cases the courts have suggested that the reality of 
finite resources means that the procedural guarantees provided by Code D must be 
qualified in cases involving less serious allegations58 while judgments in other 
cases suggest that full force of the provisions apply irrespective of the gravity of 
the offences concerned.59  
                                                 
57 Paragraph D3.12 requires a video identification to be conducted “whenever a suspect disputes 
identification”. 
58 e.g. Barnes v Chief Constable of Durham [1997] 2 Cr App R 505; Karia v DPP [2002] EWHC 
2175 Admin. 
59 e.g. North Yorkshire Trading Standards v Williams (QBD November 3, 1994) 159 JP 383. See 
also, T. Watkin, “In the Dock – A Overview of the Decisions of the High Court on Dock 
Identifications in the Magistrates’ Court” [2003] Criminal Law Review 463. 
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 A more fundamental problem with the Uniform Evidence Act is that it 
makes reception of visual identification evidence conditional on a procedure – ‘an 
identification parade’ – which it does not define or prescribe, having been 
conducted. Defining the procedure on which admissibility is predicated in only 
the most general terms undermines the purpose of the adoption of an exclusionary 
approach; that of ensuring that the evidence presented to the tribunal of fact is as 
reliable as possible. This is because it is possible for a procedure which has the 
appearance of an ‘identification parade’ and might be appropriately described as 
such to be conducted in a manner that produces evidence of little, if any, 
probative value.60  
 
(b) New Zealand: Evidence Act 2006 
 
Although the statutory scheme governing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence in New Zealand includes an exclusionary provision, it 
differs significantly from that which is provided by the Australian uniform 
legislation. Section 45(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 establishes a presumption that 
visual identification evidence will be excluded where: (i) it was obtained through 
means other than a ‘formal procedure’, and (ii) there was no ‘good reason’ for not 
following such a procedure. The Act differs from the Australian legislation in a 
number of respects. First, it provides an exhaustive list of reasons which 
constitute ‘good reasons’ for not following a formal procedure.61 However, where 
identification evidence has been obtained by means other than a formal procedure, 
and there is no good reason for the failure to conduct such a procedure, the 
prosecution may still be able to rely on the evidence if it is able to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the evidence is reliable.  
However, the operation of this ‘safety valve’ might prove to be 
problematic. Reliability is a relative rather than an absolute concept. Evidence 
may be more or less reliable; more or less helpful in assisting the fact-finder to 
evaluate the likelihood of the truth of the proposition in support of which it is 
adduced. Presumably, the prosecution will be required to show that the evidence 
which it seeks to adduce meets is sufficiently reliable. But how reliable must it be 
before it can be received? Where should the threshold of reliability for the 
                                                 
60 It has been suggested that the characteristics of ‘an identification parade’ may be determined by 
recourse to other bodies of law, common law and statute; see J. Anderson, J. Hunter and N. 
Williams, The New Evidence Law (2002, Chatswood, NSW; Butterworths), 389-391.  However, 
the nature of the common law judicial legislating process is unlikely to lead to procedures which 
are grounded in the relevant scientific findings. As to the problem of defining identification 
procedures in primary legislation, e.g. in section 3ZM(6) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), see main text 
below.  
61 Section 45(4) 
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 purposes of determining admissibility be set? We have already noted the forensic 
inadequacies of the criminal trial when it comes to the evaluation of eyewitness 
identification evidence. The reasons why the trial provides an ineffective process 
for evaluating eyewitness evidence ought to prove a significant obstacle for 
prosecution attempts to prove the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. 
In some cases there may be external factors which suggest that identification 
made by the witness was less susceptible to the risk of error, but as we noted 
previously, these factors reveal nothing about the integrity of the cognitive 
processes that produced the evidence. It provides us with no indication as to 
which class of individuals the witness belongs; those who will identify accurately 
in such circumstances or those who will make errors. In view of this the burden 
on the prosecution appears to be an onerous one.  
It was suggested above that making the admissibility of an identification 
evidence conditional on an ‘identification parade’ having been conducted appears 
to be a fundamental flaw in the Uniform Evidence Act. In New Zealand, 
admissibility is predicated on a ‘formal procedure’ having been followed. Some 
of the characteristics of such a procedure are prescribed in section 45(3) and these 
may be supplemented by further prescription in secondary legislation. In this 
event, compliance with any such regulation also becomes a condition of 
admissibility.62  
Defining or prescribing elements of formal procedures in primary 
legislation is not without its problems. Prescription contained in primary 
legislation is likely to become much more entrenched than that provided in 
delegated legislation and statutory codes. Ensuring that procedures set out in 
primary legislation reflect developments in empirical research is likely to be a 
more difficult task than it would be if those procedures were set out in sub-
ordinate legislation. Under section 45 of the Act, evidence obtained through a 
sequential lineup appears to be presumptively inadmissible. Section 45(3)(b) 
provides that a ‘formal procedure’ is one in which “the person to be identified is 
compared to no fewer than 7 other persons who are similar in appearance to the 
person to be identified” [emphasis added]. What distinguishes a sequential lineup 
from the more traditional forms of identification procedure, such as a parade, is 
that it is designed to prevent the witness comparing those who appear in the 
procedure. An answer to this might be to point to the safety valve which permits 
identification evidence obtained other than by following formal procedure defined 
in the Act and any supplementary regulations to be received where the 
prosecution can prove its reliability beyond reasonable doubt. This may be a 
course of action which is open to trial judges, but reliance on the exercise of 
judicial discretion in this way would be an unsatisfactory proxy for substantive 
                                                 
62 Section 45(3)(g). 
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 procedural reform, particularly where the product of those procedures is a form of 
evidence which is acknowledged to be problematic.  
 
III. Mitigating Quantitative Deficiencies   
 
We now turn to the second underlying function of the law relating to eyewitness 
identification evidence; mitigation of quantitative evidential deficiencies. It was 
suggested earlier that if procedures were to further the end of securing 
adjudicative accuracy, their underlying objectives ought to mitigate as far as 
possible, the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the evidence presented to 
the fact-finder. This implied not only the use of procedures known to produce the 
most accurate identification evidence, but also that eyewitness identification 
procedures should be used wherever they might produce evidence which would 
further the ends of adjudicative accuracy. However, we noted that in an 
adversarial contest the desire to prevail might lead the parties to suppress 
evidence. It was suggested that the difficulty of predicting the outcome of a 
properly conducted formal procedure may lead the police to avoid conducting one 
where there are alternative forms of evidence which might be adduced to prove 
identity. However, where there are witnesses available, the failure to conduct 
identification procedures deprives a defendant of the opportunity to obtain 
evidence which might support his case.   
 
(i) A Right to Participate in Procedures? 
 
One way of ensuring that a procedure is conducted in such circumstances is to 
provide the suspect with a right to participate in procedures where doing so might 
produce exculpatory evidence. However, this idea does not appear to have 
secured much of a foothold in any jurisdiction. In its development of Due Process 
clause jurisprudence, the US Supreme Court has confined itself to considering the 
reliability of the identification evidence on which the state has relied rather than 
the issue of participation. The prospect of recognition of this kind of participatory 
right as an element of a suspect’s broad right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights appears more promising. The ‘equality 
of arms’ principle which pervades the European Court’s Article 6 jurisprudence 
requires that the parties be given equal opportunities to present evidence.63 This 
implies that where the state has exclusive control over the means of producing 
that evidence, as it does in respect of the facilities required to conduct an 
identification procedure, it has a duty to accede to a suspect’s request for an 
                                                 
63 See generally J. Jackson, “The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: 
Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?” (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 737.  
21Roberts: Eyewitness Identification Evidence
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
 identification procedure.64 The idea that a suspect has a right to participate in an 
identification procedure is one that does not appear to have been argued before 
English appellate courts. However, the notion of such a right appears consistent 
with the English Court of Appeal’s assertion in R v Nicholson65 that identification 
procedures are a facility administered by the police for the benefit of both parties:  
 
‘Despite what might at first be thought to be the purpose of an 
identification parade, namely that it is a method or procedure by which the 
police seek to obtain evidence for the purposes of prosecuting suspects, as 
opposed to a service performed impartially for prosecution and defence, 
this court in various of its previous decisions, leaned towards the latter 
view on the basis, it seems, that a parade may produce negative evidence 
favourable to an accused which the defence are incapable of generating for 
themselves.’66 
 
Despite these observations, there are various signs of an ingrained 
perception that the purpose of formal identification procedures is to ensure the 
reliability of identification evidence tendered by the prosecution.  In R v 
Thomas,67 for example, at the defendant’s trial for armed robbery the prosecution 
relied on facial mapping evidence to prove identity. Although there were a 
number of eyewitnesses who had observed the culprit, the police failed to arrange 
any identification parades. In respect of this failure the Court of Appeal observed: 
 
“There appears to us to be a distinction between a case where the Crown 
relies for identification on a witness who could have taken part in an 
identification parade, and cases, such as the present, where the Crown does 
not rely on an identification by any such witness and seeks to identify the 
defendant by other evidence. The advantage to a defendant in the former 
situation, of having a relevant witness fail to pick him out in an 
identification parade, is greater than any advantage in the latter situation of 
having a person, who might have been an identifying witness but on the 
whom the Crown is not relying for identification, fail to identify the 
defendant on a parade”68 (original emphasis) 
 
What the court appears to be suggesting, is that the probative value of a 
witness’s failure to pick out the suspect on an identification parade is affected by 
a prosecution decision not to rely on that witness in its case. The reasoning 
                                                 
64 See further Roberts, op. cit. n.15. 
65 [1999] EWCA Crim 2101. 
66 Ibid, [28]. 
67 Unreported, November 22, 1999. 
68 supra at [43]. 
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 appears to be grounded in an idea which is traditionally associated with 
adversarial proceedings; 69 that the parties have a quasi-proprietary interest in the 
witnesses and the evidence that they provide. In Thomas, the eyewitnesses appear 
to have been viewed as a source of evidence for the prosecution rather than 
neutral repositories of information which might benefit either party.   
In some jurisdictions it has been made clear that identification procedures 
serve an important exculpatory function. The NIJ Guide, for example, states that 
the function of identification parades (or lineups) is to provide for ‘accurate 
identification or non-identification.’70 It recommends that witness be instructed 
before the procedure is conducted, that absolving the innocent from suspicion and 
convicting the guilty are equally important objectives.71 In addition, it suggests 
that witnesses be told that the person seen previously may or may not appear in 
the procedure and that the police investigation will continue regardless of whether 
or not an identification is made.72  In other jurisdictions, however, the language 
used in relevant regulatory provisions implies that identification procedures fulfill 
the more limited function of ensuring the reliability of prosecution evidence. In 
New Zealand, for example, the statutory definition of a formal identification 
procedure refers to the suspect as ‘the person to be identified’73 and the witness as 
‘the person making the identification.’ These labels appear, respectively, to be 
inconsistent with a conception of witnesses as a source of evidence which might 
assist either of the parties, and formal procedures as the means through which the 
parties may obtain that evidence.  
In England, the introductory paragraph of Code D explains that the Code 
“concerns the principal methods used by the police to identify people in 
connection with the investigation of offences…” (emphasis added).74 However, in 
the early versions of the Code the suspect’s right to participate in an identification 
procedure was explicit. The version of the Code issued in 1991 provided that “In 
a case which involves disputed identification evidence a parade must be held if 
                                                 
69 On the proprietary concept of evidence and its sources see Damaska, op. cit. n.12 , 76-77. 
70 NIJ Guide, op. cit. n.34, 29. 
71 Ibid., 32. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Evidence Act 2006, section 45(3). The statutory provisions rather confusingly use the term ‘the 
person to be identified’ both in provisions which clearly refer to the suspect and in those which 
appear to relate to the offender. Section 45(3)(c) provides that a formal procedure is one in which 
“no indication is given to the person making the identification as to whom among the persons in 
the procedure is the person to be identified”. The term “person to be identified” in this provision is 
a reference to the suspect who appears in the procedure. However, section 45(3)(d) provides that 
such a procedure is one in which “the person making the identification is informed that the person 
to be identified may or may not be among the persons identified in the procedure”. Here “the 
person to be identified” appears to be a reference to the offender. 
74 Code D, 2008 version, paragraph 1.1. 
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 the suspect asks for one and it is practicable to hold one.”’75 When the Code was 
revised in 1995 this provision was replaced with one which imposed a duty to 
conduct a parade where a suspected disputed an identification and consented to a 
procedure being conducted. 76  This reformulation did not materially affect a 
suspect’s right to participate in an identification procedure, the right which was 
expressly provided in the earlier version of the Code is necessarily implied by the 
broader duty imposed on the police in the later version. Whether the shift in 
emphasis from right to duty is desirable might be measured by the effect of the 
changes on the quantity of material which is made available to fact-finders. It 
might generally be assumed that a suspect’s interest in obtaining exculpatory 
evidence will lead him to exercise the right whenever there is a possibility that an 
identification procedure will result in an outcome which is useful to his defence. 
However, there may be various reasons why innocent suspects fail to exercise the 
right. Some might be unaware of the existence of a right or lack the wherewithal 
to assert it, while others might decline to exercise it because they perceive their 
position to be hopeless, or because of a refusal to engage with the criminal 
process out of conviction to some moral or political principle. In all but the latter 
case, the imposition of a duty to conduct an identification procedure may lead to 
an identification procedure being conducted which might not have taken place 
had the suspect been required to take the initiative and invoke a procedural right 
to participate in one.  
 
(ii) Determining When Identification Procedures Ought to be Conducted: 
Discretionary or Rule-governed Decision Processes? 
 
Both Code D and the NIJ Guide provide statements concerning the purpose of 
identification procedures. The adequacy of such statements assume particular 
significance where detailed prescription ends and officials are left to determine 
what course of action is to be followed. The extent of the regulation of the 
decision-making process which determines whether or not identification 
procedures are conducted is varies by jurisdiction. The NIJ Guide, for example, 
provides detailed guidance on the procedures that ought to be used to obtain 
identification evidence from an eyewitness, but has nothing to say regarding the 
circumstances in which those procedures should be conducted. In the absence of 
any directive, in deciding whether or not to conduct an identification procedure 
the decision-maker can be expected to refer to the function fulfilled by those 
                                                 
75  Paragraph 2.3, Code D (1991 version). A similar approach can be found in the relevant 
Australian legislation, see s3ZM(2) Crimes Act (Cth); “…an identification parade must be held if 
the suspect has requested that an identification parade be held…”  
76 Paragraph 2.3 of the version of the Code issued in 1995 provided that “Whenever a suspect 
disputes an identification, an identification parade shall be held if the suspect consents…” 
24 International Commentary on Evidence Vol. 6, No. 2, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol6/iss2/art3
 procedures. If discretion is to be exercised satisfactorily it ought to be 
accompanied by a clear and comprehensive statement of the procedures’ 
underlying purposes.77  
Relatively little thought appears to have been given to this decision-
making process. While the NIJ Guide was generally welcomed, some have 
suggested that, in practice, it might have little impact as the police will disregard 
it where it is not in their interests to follow it.78 In the context of the epistemic 
objective of mitigating the quantitative deficiencies in the evidence available at 
trial, the question of whether a procedure ought to be conducted is one of 
considerable importance. Is it one that ought to be left to the discretion of 
officials who have de facto control over the means of conducting a procedure, and 
whose partisan interests might be served by ensuring that none takes place? The 
obvious answer to this question might be ‘no, there ought to be a rule determining 
when procedures are conducted.’ However, developments in English criminal 
procedure illustrate the problems both of framing a suitable directive and 
enforcing it.  
An inescapable feature of prescriptive rules is their under- and over-
inclusiveness.79 Rules are intended to guide action across a class of cases. They 
prescribe a course of action which is to be followed whenever the decision-maker 
is presented with some set of circumstances or facts which are thought to be 
characteristics of a problem which rule is designed to address. Because it will not 
be possible to take account of (or even envisage) the infinite variety of factual 
circumstances with which decision-makers will be faced, rules are necessarily 
probabilistic. The best that the drafter of a rule can do is to identify features 
which commonly signal the existence of the problem that the prescriptive content 
of the rule is intended to address. It was noted above that the 1995 version of 
Code D established a relatively simple rule, requiring the police to conduct an 
identification parade whenever identification was disputed and the suspect 
consented to a parade being held. Without ever adequately identifying the 
underlying purpose of this provision, the English appellate courts proceeded to 
modify it where it was found to be over- and under-inclusive. In R v Rutherford & 
Palmer,80 for example, it was held that a parade should be conducted not only 
where identification was, in fact, disputed, but also where such a dispute could 
reasonably be anticipated.  
                                                 
77  See D. Galligan, ‘Regulating Pre-trial Decisions’, in I.H. Dennis (ed), Criminal Law and 
Justice, (1987, London; Sweet & Maxwell); reproduced in N. Lacey, A Reader on Criminal 
Justice, (1994, Oxford; OUP). 
78 I. McKenzie, “Eyewitness Evidence: Will the United States Guide for Law Enforcement Make 
Any Difference?”, (2003) 7 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 237.  
79 See generally, F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules, (1994, Oxford; Clarendon). 
80 (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 191 
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 Some of the judicial modifications to the provision were consolidated in the 
decision of the House of Lords in R v Forbes.81 It was said that the provision 
which required an identification parade to be conducted was mandatory, although 
it should not be construed to cover all possible situations. A number of 
circumstances were identified in which it would not be necessary to conduct an 
identification parade, including those in which the witness stated that he would 
not be able to identify the culprit. Nor would a parade serve any useful purpose if 
the witness would only be able to identify the clothing worn by the culprit, or if 
the case was one in which the suspect was someone who was well-known to the 
witness. Recognition of these exceptions might be viewed as doing no more than 
modifying the rule. However, the Lords, while asserting that the provision 
imposed a mandatory obligation to conduct a parade, then went on to suggest that 
there may be further unspecified ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which it would 
not be necessary to conduct a parade. Presumably, determining whether those 
circumstances existed would be a matter for the official who was responsible for 
arranging a procedure, in which case he appears to possess a discretion to 
disregard the rule where it appears to him to provide an unsatisfactory outcome. 
But if the official is free to determine whether the provision applies, can it be said 
to be mandatory? Is it still a rule? To compound this confusion, in the version of 
the Code which was issued in 2003, the relatively simple rule which required a 
parade to be conducted whenever a suspect disputed identification and consented 
to appear in one, was replaced with the following provision: 
 
“Whenever: 
 
(i) a witness has identified a suspect or purported to identify them 
prior to [an identification procedure] having been held; or 
 
(ii) there is a witness, who expresses an ability to identify the 
suspect, or where there is a reasonable chance of the witness 
being able to do so, and they have not been given an 
opportunity to identify the suspect in [an identification 
procedure];  
 
and the suspect disputes being the person the witness claims to have 
seen, an identification procedure shall be held unless it is not 
practicable or it would serve no useful purpose in proving or 
disproving whether the suspect was involved in committing the 
offence. For example, when it is not disputed that the suspect is 
                                                 
81 [2001] 1 All ER 686 
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 already well-known to the witness who claims to have seen them 
commit the crime.”82 
 
Replacement of the term ‘identification parade’ with the generic term 
‘identification procedure’ reflected the change in the hierarchy of procedures 
(video identification replacing the identification parade as the preferred procedure) 
which was effected in this version of the Code.  Although the revised provision 
uses prescriptive language – “an identification procedure shall be held” – the 
official who contemplates the question of whether a procedure should be 
conducted is permitted to consider whether doing so would serve any useful 
purpose in “proving or disproving whether the suspect was involved in 
committing the offence”. This is undesirable for a number of reasons. The first, a 
problem which we have already touched upon, is that it appears to require the 
police, who have partisan interests, to adopt an objective view of the value of 
conducting a procedure in the circumstances.   
More fundamentally, it appears to be an exception which swallows the rule. 
It has been suggested here that one of the underlying functions of the law 
concerning eyewitness identification evidence is to further the objective of 
ensuring accurate adjudication by mitigating quantitative deficiencies in the 
evidence made available to the tribunal of fact. If the decision-maker is permitted 
to consult the background purpose of a rule, any peremptory force which it 
possessed is exhausted. Whether this is desirable, and whether our preference 
ought to be for rules or discretion in relation to this type of decision, ought to 
depend on which will lead to the higher incidence of satisfactory decision-making. 
In other words, the decision-making process ought to be determined by 
ascertaining whether a rule-governed or discretionary decision-making process is 
the more effective means of mitigating quantitative deficiencies in the evidence 
available at trial. Of course, a rule which requires a formal identification 
procedure to be conducted in every case would best achieve this end, but it would 
also constitute an unsustainable drain on resources. The adequacy of either 
process can only be properly determined in light of empirical data and although 
there is a substantial body of empirical research on formal identification 
procedures, the legal decision-making which surrounds the use of those 
procedures is an issue which has been largely overlooked.83 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Code D, 2003 version, paragraph 3.12.  
83 A. Roberts, Current Legal Issues, op. cit. n. 8. 
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 IV. Conclusion 
 
While steps have been taken to mitigate the risk of miscarriage of justice on the 
basis of mistaken identification in most jurisdictions over the past decade, much 
more could be done to ensure that identification evidence presented at trial is as 
complete and reliable as possible. Developments across jurisdictions are generally 
piecemeal and atomistic. The NIJ Guide provides detailed model procedures 
which have no prescriptive force. In England and Wales Code D prescribes 
formal identification procedures and the circumstances in which they are to be 
used in some detail. However, a reading of appellate hearings suggests that, more 
often than not, breaches of the provisions of the Code are largely inconsequential 
in relation to the issue of the admissibility of identification evidence. It seems that 
English courts place too much faith in the criminal trial as a means of establishing 
the reliability of such evidence. In contrast, the forensic inadequacy of the trial 
appears to have led to the adoption in Australia and New Zealand of statutory 
presumptions against the reception of such evidence where there has been a 
failure to conduct a formal identification procedure in the pre-trial stage of 
proceedings. However, the effectiveness of this approach may be undermined by 
the failure to prescribe, in sufficient detail, the formal identification procedures 
on which the reception of evidence is predicated. In those jurisdictions in which 
procedures are prescribed in some detail, few have adopted the sequential lineup 
which appears to provide the greatest degree of accuracy.  
The aim of the great majority of procedural reforms has been to ensure 
that the eyewitness identification evidence which is presented to fact-finders is 
reliable. However, the problem of ensuring that the tribunal of fact is not denied 
an opportunity to take such evidence into account is an issue which has received 
very little attention. The idea that suspects might have a right to participate in 
identification procedures is one that does not appear to have been acknowledged 
in many jurisdictions. Satisfactory development of the law in this direction will 
require legislatures, the courts, and those responsible for administering 
identification procedures to have a better understanding of the normative 
purposes that ought to be served by the procedural law relating to eyewitness 
identification evidence.  
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